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Disjunctivism. Contemporary readings. (2009)
EN HCISBN: 9780262026550 bzw. 0262026554, in Englisch, Edited by Alex Bryne and Heather Logue. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 2009, gebundenes Buch.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Steven Wolfe Books [857919], Newton Centre, MA, U.S.A.
, xxix, 334pp., very good black cloth, light wear, remainder mark on bottom foredge CONTENTS: Visual experiences / J.M. Hinton -- Selections from Experiences / J.M. Hinton -- Perception, vision, and causation / Paul Snowdon -- The objects of perceptual experience / Paul Snowdon -- Selections from "Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge" / John McDowell -- The reality of appearances / M.G.F. Martin -- Arguments from illusion / Jonathan Dancy -- The idea of experience / Alan Millar -- Selections from Perception / Howard Robinson -- Selections from The problem of perception / A.D. Smith -- The theory of appearing defended / Harold Langsam -- The obscure object of hallucination / Mark Johnston -- The limits of self-awareness / M.G.F. Martin. ISBN 9780262026550.
, xxix, 334pp., very good black cloth, light wear, remainder mark on bottom foredge CONTENTS: Visual experiences / J.M. Hinton -- Selections from Experiences / J.M. Hinton -- Perception, vision, and causation / Paul Snowdon -- The objects of perceptual experience / Paul Snowdon -- Selections from "Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge" / John McDowell -- The reality of appearances / M.G.F. Martin -- Arguments from illusion / Jonathan Dancy -- The idea of experience / Alan Millar -- Selections from Perception / Howard Robinson -- Selections from The problem of perception / A.D. Smith -- The theory of appearing defended / Harold Langsam -- The obscure object of hallucination / Mark Johnston -- The limits of self-awareness / M.G.F. Martin. ISBN 9780262026550.
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Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings (MIT Readers in Contemporary Philosophy) (2009)
~EN PB US RPISBN: 9780262524902 bzw. 0262524902, Band: 1, vermutlich in Englisch, MIT Press, Taschenbuch, gebraucht, guter Zustand, Nachdruck.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Grossbritannien und Nordirland, Versandkosten nach: DEU.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Lady Lisa's Bookshop.
grey black: MIT Press, 2009. Paperback. Used: Acceptable. Ref ZKVQ Condition good, clean. A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change, disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences are radically different. Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as well as attracting much criticism. This reader collects for the first time in one volume classic texts that define and react to disjunctivism. These include an excerpt from a book by the late J. M. Hinton, who was the first to propose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and papers stating a number of important objections. Contributors: Alex Byrne, Jonathan Dancy, J. M. Hinton, Mark Johnston, Harold Langsam, Heather Logue, M. G. F. Martin, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Paul Snowdon. "[ Disjunctivism], a reprinting of some of the most important articles on disjunctivism, shows how the history of disjunctivism developed." Tim Crane Times Literary Supplement Alex Byrne is Professor of Philosophy at MIT and the coeditor of Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson (2001) and Readings on Color, volumes 1 and 2 (1997), all published by the MIT Press. Heather Logue is a graduate student in Philosophy at MIT.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Lady Lisa's Bookshop.
grey black: MIT Press, 2009. Paperback. Used: Acceptable. Ref ZKVQ Condition good, clean. A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change, disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences are radically different. Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as well as attracting much criticism. This reader collects for the first time in one volume classic texts that define and react to disjunctivism. These include an excerpt from a book by the late J. M. Hinton, who was the first to propose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and papers stating a number of important objections. Contributors: Alex Byrne, Jonathan Dancy, J. M. Hinton, Mark Johnston, Harold Langsam, Heather Logue, M. G. F. Martin, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Paul Snowdon. "[ Disjunctivism], a reprinting of some of the most important articles on disjunctivism, shows how the history of disjunctivism developed." Tim Crane Times Literary Supplement Alex Byrne is Professor of Philosophy at MIT and the coeditor of Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson (2001) and Readings on Color, volumes 1 and 2 (1997), all published by the MIT Press. Heather Logue is a graduate student in Philosophy at MIT.
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Byrne, Alex [Editor]; Logue, Heather [Editor]; Hinton, J.M. [Contributor]; Snowdon, Paul [Contributor]; McDowell, John [Contributor]; Martin, M. G. F. [Contributor]; Dancy, Jonathan [Contributor]; Millar, Alan [Contributor]; Robinson, Howard [Contributor]
Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings (MIT Readers in Contemporary Philosophy) (2008)
~EN PB USISBN: 9780262524902 bzw. 0262524902, vermutlich in Englisch, The MIT Press, Taschenbuch, gebraucht, guter Zustand.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Versandkosten nach: DEU.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Spellbound.
The MIT Press, 12/19/2008. Paperback. Like New. LIKE NEW/UNREAD!!! Text is Clean and Unmarked! Has a small black line on the bottom/exterior edge of pages.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Spellbound.
The MIT Press, 12/19/2008. Paperback. Like New. LIKE NEW/UNREAD!!! Text is Clean and Unmarked! Has a small black line on the bottom/exterior edge of pages.
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Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings (MIT Readers in Contemporary Philosophy) (2008)
EN HC NWISBN: 9780262026550 bzw. 0262026554, in Englisch, 368 Seiten, The MIT Press, gebundenes Buch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Usually ships in 2-3 business days.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, TOTAL BOOKS.
A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change, disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences are radically different. Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as well as attracting much criticism. This reader collects for the first time in one volume classic texts that define and react to disjunctivism. These include an excerpt from a book by the late J. M. Hinton, who was the first to propose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and papers stating a number of important objections.Contributors: Alex Byrne, Jonathan Dancy, J. M. Hinton, Mark Johnston, Harold Langsam, Heather Logue, M. G. F. Martin, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Paul Snowdon, Hardcover, Label: The MIT Press, The MIT Press, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2008-12-19, Studio: The MIT Press, Verkaufsrang: 866206.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, TOTAL BOOKS.
A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change, disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences are radically different. Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as well as attracting much criticism. This reader collects for the first time in one volume classic texts that define and react to disjunctivism. These include an excerpt from a book by the late J. M. Hinton, who was the first to propose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and papers stating a number of important objections.Contributors: Alex Byrne, Jonathan Dancy, J. M. Hinton, Mark Johnston, Harold Langsam, Heather Logue, M. G. F. Martin, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Paul Snowdon, Hardcover, Label: The MIT Press, The MIT Press, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2008-12-19, Studio: The MIT Press, Verkaufsrang: 866206.
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Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings (MIT Readers in Contemporary Philosophy) (2008)
EN HC USISBN: 9780262026550 bzw. 0262026554, in Englisch, 368 Seiten, The MIT Press, gebundenes Buch, gebraucht.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Usually ships in 1-2 business days.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, * Pinecone Bookshoppe *.
A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change, disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences are radically different. Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as well as attracting much criticism. This reader collects for the first time in one volume classic texts that define and react to disjunctivism. These include an excerpt from a book by the late J. M. Hinton, who was the first to propose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and papers stating a number of important objections.Contributors: Alex Byrne, Jonathan Dancy, J. M. Hinton, Mark Johnston, Harold Langsam, Heather Logue, M. G. F. Martin, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Paul Snowdon, Hardcover, Label: The MIT Press, The MIT Press, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2008-12-19, Studio: The MIT Press, Verkaufsrang: 866206.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, * Pinecone Bookshoppe *.
A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change, disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences are radically different. Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as well as attracting much criticism. This reader collects for the first time in one volume classic texts that define and react to disjunctivism. These include an excerpt from a book by the late J. M. Hinton, who was the first to propose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and papers stating a number of important objections.Contributors: Alex Byrne, Jonathan Dancy, J. M. Hinton, Mark Johnston, Harold Langsam, Heather Logue, M. G. F. Martin, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Paul Snowdon, Hardcover, Label: The MIT Press, The MIT Press, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2008-12-19, Studio: The MIT Press, Verkaufsrang: 866206.
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Disjunctivism
EN NWISBN: 9780262026550 bzw. 0262026554, in Englisch, MIT Press Ltd, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Grossbritannien und Nordirland, zzgl. Versandkosten, in-stock.
A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change, disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences are radically different. Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as well as attracting much criticism. This reader collects for the first time in one volume classic texts that define and react to disjunctivism. These include an excerpt from a book by the late J.M. Hinton, who was the first to propose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and papers stating a number of important objections. Contributors: Alex Byrne, Jonathan Dancy, J.M. Hinton, Mark Johnston, Harold Langsam, Heather Logue, M.G.F. Martin, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Howard Robinson, A.D. Smith, Paul Snowdon.
A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change, disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences are radically different. Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as well as attracting much criticism. This reader collects for the first time in one volume classic texts that define and react to disjunctivism. These include an excerpt from a book by the late J.M. Hinton, who was the first to propose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and papers stating a number of important objections. Contributors: Alex Byrne, Jonathan Dancy, J.M. Hinton, Mark Johnston, Harold Langsam, Heather Logue, M.G.F. Martin, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Howard Robinson, A.D. Smith, Paul Snowdon.
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Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings (MIT Readers in Contemporary Philosophy) (2008)
~EN NWISBN: 9780262026550 bzw. 0262026554, vermutlich in Englisch, The Mit Press, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Versandkosten nach: DEU.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, awardlink.
Classic texts that define the disjunctivist theory of perception.A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change, disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences are radically different. Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as well as attracting much criticism. This reader collects for the first time in one volume classic texts that define and react to disjunctivism. These include an excerpt from a book by the late J. M. Hinton, who was the first to propose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and papers stating a number of important objections.ContributorsAlex Byrne, Jonathan Dancy, J. M. Hinton, Mark Johnston, Harold Langsam, Heather Logue, M. G. F. Martin, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Paul Snowdon.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, awardlink.
Classic texts that define the disjunctivist theory of perception.A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change, disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences are radically different. Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as well as attracting much criticism. This reader collects for the first time in one volume classic texts that define and react to disjunctivism. These include an excerpt from a book by the late J. M. Hinton, who was the first to propose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and papers stating a number of important objections.ContributorsAlex Byrne, Jonathan Dancy, J. M. Hinton, Mark Johnston, Harold Langsam, Heather Logue, M. G. F. Martin, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Paul Snowdon.
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Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings
ENISBN: 9780262524902 bzw. 0262524902, in Englisch, MIT Press (MA).
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Lagernd, zzgl. Versandkosten.
Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings Byrne, Alex / Logue, Heather, Winning entry, Professional Cover/Jacket Category, in the 2009 New England Book Show sponsored by Bookbuilders of Boston. A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change, disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences are radically different. Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as well as attracting much criticism. This reader collects for the first time in one volume classic texts that define and react to disjunctivism. These include an excerpt from a book by the late J. M. Hinton, who was the first to propose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and essays stating a number of important objections. Contributors: Alex Byrne, Jonathan Dancy, J. M. Hinton, Mark Johnston, Harold Langsam, Heather Logue, M. G. F. Martin, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Paul Snowdon "MIT Readers in Contemporary Philosophy".
Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings Byrne, Alex / Logue, Heather, Winning entry, Professional Cover/Jacket Category, in the 2009 New England Book Show sponsored by Bookbuilders of Boston. A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change, disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences are radically different. Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as well as attracting much criticism. This reader collects for the first time in one volume classic texts that define and react to disjunctivism. These include an excerpt from a book by the late J. M. Hinton, who was the first to propose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and essays stating a number of important objections. Contributors: Alex Byrne, Jonathan Dancy, J. M. Hinton, Mark Johnston, Harold Langsam, Heather Logue, M. G. F. Martin, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Paul Snowdon "MIT Readers in Contemporary Philosophy".
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